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The initial impact of COVID-19 and policy 
responses on household incomes
Mike Brewer* and Laura Gardiner**
Abstract: As soon as the scale of the coronavirus shock to the economy became clear, the UK gov-
ernment introduced three policies to protect directly household incomes: a Job Retention Scheme, to 
pay the wages of employees who were temporarily furloughed; a Self-Employment Income Support 
Scheme, to give grants to established self-employed people whose businesses had been affected; and 
a package of increases to entitlements to social security benefits, with Universal Credit at the core, 
that bolstered the UK’s means-tested ‘safety net’. This paper analyses the design and beneficiaries of 
these policies and, given the distributional pattern of the labour market shock, considers the emerging 
overall impact on living standards, particularly of low-income households.
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I. Introduction
The UK is in the midst of the biggest shock to economic activity that it has experienced 
for hundreds of years, one that is rooted in the labour market, driven by the shutting 
down of certain sectors of the economy and the effects of social distancing rules. At the 
time of writing, the Bank of England is expecting the economy to shrink by 25 per cent 
in the second quarter of 2020 (and by 14 per cent for the year as a whole). The Office for 
Budget Responsibility (OBR) is expecting a 35 per cent GDP fall in the second quarter.
This paper assesses how the crisis is affecting, or is likely to affect, household incomes, 
and particularly low-income households. In section II, we assess the three core compo-
nents of the UK government’s strategy to directly protect household incomes: the social 
security system (including the changes announced once the crisis began), and the new 
Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme and the Self-Employment Income Support Scheme 
(we limit our attention to policies announced by the UK government and do not discuss 
the (very minor) additional policies announced by the devolved administrations). Using 
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microsimulation methods, we show how well these changes protect households from the 
financial implications of unemployment. In section III, we discuss the emerging evi-
dence on the impact of the crisis on the distribution of living standards. Although there 
is not yet a consensus, it seems that the fall in household incomes is more evenly spread 
across the income distribution than the loss of jobs is distributed across the earnings 
distribution, and may even be greater among those on higher (pre-crisis) incomes. But 
we also show that other indicators of financial well-being or living standards than in-
come paint a more worrying story about the ways that the crisis is affecting low-income 
households.2 We conclude in section IV.
One limitation of this article is that, given the evidence and data sources that we draw 
on, it may not reflect the experiences of those people facing the worst disadvantage. 
We do not make any attempt to analyse, for example, how the analysis is affecting the 
homeless population. Attention has also been drawn to those whose migration status 
means that they are not able to claim means-tested social security benefits because they 
are in the UK on the condition that they have no recourse to public funds (Gower and 
Kennedy, 2020). Much of the near real-time research that is being done during the 
coronavirus crisis is through online surveys, and so will miss the digitally excluded. We 
acknowledge these drawbacks, as well as recognizing that behind the data we describe 
lie millions of households experiencing genuine hardship and financial strain.
II. The initial UK government response to the coronavirus
(i) Details of the measures to protect household incomes directly
Like other countries, the UK government has responded to the current crisis with a set 
of policies unprecedented in their scope and cost. Indeed, the UK’s has been one of the 
largest fiscal responses among advanced economies (Hughes et al., 2020). Here, how-
ever, we focus on the three elements relating more directly to individual and household 
incomes: the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (JRS), the Self-Employment Income 
Support Scheme (SEISS), and changes to the social security system.
The JRS takes the unprecedented step of directly supporting employers to pay the 
wage bills of employees ‘furloughed’ without work to do. From April to July, the JRS 
paid 80 per cent of pre-coronavirus wages, up to £2,500 a month, and on current plans 
it will continue to pay 80 per cent in August to October, but with a lower cap and some 
cost-sharing with employers (HMRC, 2020). The idea is that when economic activity 
picks up, furloughed employees will go back to their pre-crisis work, but this is not a 
formal condition placed on employers. By mid-June, around 9 million jobs had been 
supported at some point by the scheme (HMRC, n.d.). The JRS is the largest single 
part of the government’s response, with the total (gross) cost currently estimated to be 
around £60 billion (OBR, 2020).
The SEISS can be seen as a parallel scheme for the self-employed, in that it pro-
vides similar levels of income replacement over two sets of grants intended to cover a 
2 The risk of an article such as this is that it could soon be out of date; this article was finalized in early 
July 2020, and Brewer (2020) will contain a more up-to-date summary of the UK evidence.
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6-month period. It is restricted to unincorporated self-employed businesses; those with 
profits above £50,000 are excluded, as are the newly self-employed (i.e. those without at 
least one complete tax return in the 3 years up to 2018/19, although there is a separate 
scheme in Scotland to help this group). By mid-June, 2.6 million claims for the initial 
grant payment had been made (HMRC, n.d.). The expected total gross cost is £15 bil-
lion (OBR, 2020).
The government has also announced major changes to the social security system.3 
The most important was a £20 per week increase in the standard allowance of Universal 
Credit (UC), an increase that was mirrored in the Working Tax Credit, but not in the 
contributory (‘new-style’ Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) and Employment and Support 
Allowance (ESA)) or other ‘legacy’ benefits. This change aligns the main adult rate of 
benefits for an unemployed single adult to the level of Statutory Sick Pay, and means it 
is at its highest ever level in real terms, and at its highest level relative to average earn-
ings since 1998/99 (see Figure 1). It is noteworthy that the size of the COVID-19 rise in 
UC was the same for all family types, with no additional help offered to families with 
children.4 In addition, Local Housing Allowance (LHA) rates (which determine caps on 
housing support in UC and Housing Benefit for private-sector tenants) were increased, 
particularly favouring areas in which rents have grown rapidly since 2012 (Judge and 
Pacitti, 2020). We discuss more who gains from this reform in the next section, but we 
note now that the detailed rules about UC entitlement mean that the UC increase will 
not be felt in full by recipients who are affected by the benefit cap (although some of the 
newly unemployed will benefit from a 9-month grace period), and the LHA increases 
do not benefit renters in those parts of London that are affected by a national cap on 
LHA rates. These measures followed some technical changes in the March 2020 Budget 
that help the self-employed, including the suspension of the minimum income floor in 
UC (which in effect increases the amount that very low-income self-employed work-
ers can claim), and the removal of the 7-day waiting period that restricted access to 
contributory ESA (which self-employed people can claim when sick or self-isolating). 
Local authorities were also given extra funds to provide help with Council Tax bills 
and to enhance local welfare provision. At the time of announcing the measures, the 
government said that the boost to social security benefits and tax credits would apply 
only during the 2020/21 financial year, and the latest estimate is that it will cost £8 bil-
lion (OBR, 2020).
3 We do not attempt to give a thorough guide to the social security system in the UK. It will help to know 
that the two most important benefits for those who are made unemployed are ‘contributory’ or ‘new style’ 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), and Universal Credit. ‘New style’ JSA is available to former employees who 
have made sufficient National Insurance contributions, and is payable without a means test (i.e. regardless of 
how much an individual has in savings or whether they are living with a partner with their own earnings). It 
is paid at a low flat rate that does not try to reflect any additional needs that a person might have, including 
the presence of a partner or children. Those formerly self-employed are not able to claim. Universal Credit, 
like all means-tested benefits in the UK, does not require someone to have made sufficient National Insurance 
contributions, and entitlement is usually higher for families with children or health or disability needs, for 
example, than those without. But awards are means tested against the total income of the family and any 
savings. Different benefits are available to those who cannot work through ill-health or disability, and we do 
not discuss those further.
4 A scheme was introduced to give vouchers or food parcels to families whose children would have re-
ceived free school meals had they been attending school, but this is simply maintaining the pre-pandemic 
levels of support, rather than providing additional help to those with children.
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(ii) Assessment of what the measures have done to the amount of 
income protection provided by the state
Given that the impact of COVID-19 on household incomes is operating primarily 
through the labour market, it is important to understand how the tax and benefit 
system, together with the new policies announced in response to the pandemic, act to 
protect household incomes in the event of job loss.
Figure 2, from Brewer and Handscomb (2020), shows how replacement rates (these 
report how much income someone would have if  they lost their job expressed as a 
proportion of the income they had when in work) vary by personal and family char-
acteristics in the 2020–21 system after the new measures, as well as showing median 
replacement rates under the tax and benefit system that we were due to have from April 
2020 in the absence of the emergency benefit increases (Adam et al. (2020) have similar 
analysis). It shows a great deal of variation in the extent to which the social security 
system protects people from the financial consequences of unemployment. This reflects 
at least three factors. First, people’s entitlement to benefits if  they do not work will 
depend on their family circumstances, meaning that two people on similar levels of 
earning may face different replacement rates (this can be seen in the low replacement 
rates for single adults without children who have low entitlements to benefits compared 
to those with children, especially for those under 25). Second, benefits paid in the event 
of unemployment in the UK are paid at a (low) flat rate, irrespective of previous earn-
ings, and so those on higher earnings tend to face lower replacement rates. Third, asset 
tests in the calculation of UC mean that families with more than £16,000 of savings 
will miss out on this support entirely (as shown in, for example, Figure 19 in Brewer 
and Handscomb (2020)). Such tests have their justifications, but pose challenges to the 
Figure 1: The value of the main rate of unemployment-related benefit over time for a single adult
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
£0
£10
£20
£30
£40
£50
£60
£70
£80
£90
£100
1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020
Real value per week (CPI-
adjusted, January 2020 prices, left
As a proportion of average 
weekly earnings (right axis)
As a proportion of the adult
minimum wage, 40 hours a week 
(right axis)
Basic unemployment support
has risen to £94 for 2020-21
Notes: Full-time earnings on the minimum wage calculated based on a 40-hour week.
Source: Figure 16 of Brewer and Handscomb (2020).
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social security system’s ability to function as a safety net during such a large and rapid 
economic shock.5
Figure 2 shows that the impact of the coronavirus reforms was to increase the median 
replacement rate across all workers from 50 to 53 per cent. However, the fact that the in-
crease to UC was a flat-rate £20 per week for all family types means that the maximum 
UC entitlement for a couple aged 25 or over with two children rose by just 11 per cent 
(and median replacement rates for workers in these families improved by just 3 ppts), 
whereas the rate for a single adult under 25 rose by 36 per cent on its 2019 value (and 
the median replacement rate for this group improved by 8 ppts).
Figure 20 of Brewer and Handscomb (2020) shows that the degree of income protec-
tion provided by the social security system is significantly weaker than that provided 
by the JRS and SEISS. In a world where all employees are placed on the JRS and all 
self-employed workers receive the SEISS, then the median replacement rate is 91 per 
cent (it is greater than 80 per cent partly because many people will pay lower effective 
tax rates after a 20 per cent fall in earnings, partly because some people on the JRS 
can also claim means-tested support through UC, and partly because of the earnings 
of working partners for those in couples), compared to 53 per cent without it). This 
Figure 2: Family income replacement rates when earner stops working and claims benefits by selected 
characteristics, latest policy: UK, 2020–21
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Notes: Replacement rates shown for benefit unit income before housing costs, for adults aged 16–64 
who stop working and then claim benefits as entitled. Partner income held constant. Full roll-out of UC 
and full take-up of benefits assumed.
Source: Brewer and Handscomb (2020).
5 International comparisons of replacement rates are difficult and can depend on family circumstances 
and the duration of unemployment, but Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
comparisons do show that the UK ranks towards the bottom of international league tables in terms of the 
amount of income protection provided by benefits in the event of unemployment: see https://data.oecd.org/
benwage/benefits-in-unemployment-share-of-previous-income.htm#indicator-chart, accessed 22 May 2020, 
for example, which looks at replacement rates for single adults without children paid at 67 per cent of the 
national average.
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highlights a very important issue of fairness: that those former employees who are not 
currently benefiting from the JRS—perhaps because they were made redundant, or 
were ineligible because they had only just started a new job as the crisis hit, or because 
their employer went bust—will be typically experiencing a far greater hit to their in-
comes than those (relatively) lucky enough to be furloughed. It also suggests that, as 
the JRS scheme is reformed during the second half  of 2020, any currently furloughed 
workers who are made redundant may experience large falls in their family income.
III. What is (likely to be) the impact of COVID-19 on 
household incomes?
High-quality data on household incomes tends to be released with long lags and so 
official estimates of income poverty and inequality for current (at the time of writing) 
financial year, 2020/21, will not be available until March 2022.
Until then, we have to rely on other sources. We first summarize what is known about 
the distribution of the initial impact on jobs and earnings based on data from online 
surveys of individuals or households. We then consider what is known about the im-
pact of the policy measures. After that, we summarize attempts made to combine these 
and ‘nowcast’ (see Navicke et al., 2014) the entire distribution in a way that allows re-
searchers to isolate the impact of the crisis on the distribution of income. Finally, we 
look at what we can learn from measures of living standards and financial wellbeing 
other than income.
Before doing that, it is worth looking back at how low-income households have fared 
in previous recessions and economic crises. In the UK recessions of the mid-1970s, the 
early 1980s, and the early 1990s, the number of individuals in relative poverty—defined 
as living in a household with less than 60 per cent of median income—fell, driven by 
large reductions in pensioner poverty (Muriel and Sibieta, 2009). This happened be-
cause pensioners get most of their income from sources other than the labour market, 
and so they tend to move up the income distribution when unemployment rises and 
earnings from the labour market fall, reducing the number below a floating poverty line. 
Indicators of poverty that use an anchored poverty threshold increased in all three of 
these recessions; this is what most people would predict: during recessions and crises, 
living standards, as a whole, fall.
In the recession that followed the global financial crisis, relative poverty fell very 
slightly from 2007/08 to 2012/13, with falls among pensioners that were almost entirely 
offset by rises among other groups. Unusually, poverty assessed with an anchored pov-
erty line hardly changed from 2007/08 to 2010/11, but then started to rise in 2011/12, 
especially for those below the state pension age, due to the austerity measures that fol-
lowed. This reminds us that the policy responses to crises determine the impact on the 
vulnerable as much as the initial economic shock.
(i) The distributional impact of the initial labour market shock
At the time of writing, the usual official estimates of the employment and unemploy-
ment rate were still somewhat dated. Timelier data give a better sense of the scale of 
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/oxrep/article/36/Supplem
ent_1/S187/5863392 by guest on 02 O
ctober 2020
The initial impact of COVID-19 and policy responses on household incomes S193
the impact of restrictions on economic activity from late March on the jobs market, 
though, with a fall of 612,000 in employee jobs captured by PAYE systems between 
March and May, an 1.6 million increase (up to 2.8 million) in the claimant count 
measure of unemployment-related benefit recipients, and a more-than-halving of va-
cancy numbers (by early May). These numbers, although representing extremely large 
changes in just 2 months, are without doubt much lower than they would have been had 
the JRS not been in existence, which has supported 9 million jobs at some point in that 
same time period. More granular week-by-week data from the Labour Force Survey 
suggest a more acute contraction in hours worked (which will reflect that those people 
furloughed should not actually be working) than in employee numbers, with average 
hours worked falling by around a fifth between the last week of April 2020 and the same 
week a year earlier.6
If  that gives a sense of scale, then what can we say about the distribution of these 
effects? Gardiner and Slaughter (2020), who analyse an online survey of 6,000 working-
age adults from May 2020, find that 36 per cent of workers in the bottom quintile of 
pre-coronavirus earnings have experienced job loss, furloughing, or cuts in hours and 
earnings compared with 16 per cent in the top quintile. Both they and Adams-Prassl 
et al. (2020) (who draw on a separate online survey fielded in April 2020) show that 
these outcomes have been more common for those with atypical work arrangements 
(particularly temporary workers in the case of job loss; and non-salaried, zero-hours 
contract, and variable hours workers in the case of furloughing). These findings are 
broadly replicated in Benzeval et al. (2020), who find large and significant reductions 
in average working hours for women, likely to be reflecting at least in part the dispro-
portionate additional childcare and home schooling hours working mothers have taken 
on in the face of school and nursery closures (Andrew et al., 2020). And both Benzeval 
et al. (2020) and Gustafsson (2020) suggest that employment impacts have been concen-
trated among the youngest and oldest workers. Of course, these findings hide hetero-
geneity in outcomes among the groups mentioned, reflecting variations between sectors 
and the ability to work from home (Gustafsson and McCurdy, 2020; Joyce and Xu, 
2020), as well as the fact that designated ‘key workers’ (meaning those in jobs which 
had to continue even when the lockdown was at its most severe) are more likely to be in 
the bottom half  of earners than the top half  (Farquharson et al., 2020; Gustafsson and 
McCurdy, 2020). But the emerging conclusion is that the labour market shock has, so 
far, hit lower earners much harder than the better paid.
There is, though, a difference between having low earnings and being on a low in-
come. Brewer and Gardiner (2020) show that the incidence of job loss or reductions 
in earnings is more common in the second and third quintiles of the working-age in-
come distribution than in the bottom quintile, because around half  of adults in the 
bottom quintile were not in work before the pandemic began. Similarly, Benzeval et al. 
(2020, Table 5)  show that the pattern of declines in earnings—which are greater for 
low-income households than high-income households—are flatter when looking at all 
households, compared to when restricted just to households who had some earnings 
pre-pandemic. The conclusion that ‘falls in market income affect only those engaged 
6 Claimant count data is in ONS (2020a). Hours worked each week is in ONS (2020c). Data from PAYE 
systems is reported in ONS (2020b).
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with the market’ is uncontroversial, but it is important when considering the impact on 
low-income households.
(ii) The direct impact of the government’s coronavirus measures
We consider here the three major measures in turn.
Broadly speaking, and relative to a counterfactual of job loss, the JRS will benefit 
those employees whose employers furloughed them. The fact that support via the JRS 
is based on a percentage of prior earnings up to a high cap will mean that higher earners 
who have been furloughed benefit most in absolute terms, but less as a fraction of pre-
vious earnings. Survey data suggest that being furloughed is more common among low 
earners than high earners (Figure 1 of Gardiner and Slaughter (2020)), but that, among 
all (working-age) adults, furloughing has been most common in the middle of the (pre-
crisis) household income distribution (see Figure 3 of Brewer and Gardiner (2020)); 
this is because low earners are not found only in low-income households. Brewer and 
Tasseva (2020, Figure 1) estimate the impact of the JRS on household incomes, as-
suming that the counterfactual is that the worker would have no earnings at all, and 
find that the impact of the JRS is slightly greater, as a percentage of disposable income, 
in (pre-crisis) income decile groups 6–9 than it is in 2–5, but that its impact tails off  in 
the top decile group because of the £2,500 per month cap, and is much smaller in the 
Figure 3: Change in household income and spending compared to before the coronavirus outbreak 
began, by 18–65-year-old family income quintile before coronavirus (exc. retired and students): UK, 
6–11 May 2020
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lowest-income decile group because fewer adults were in work pre-crisis (Bronka et al. 
(2020, Figure 3) have similar conclusions). This suggests that the distributional impact 
of the JRS, when considered across all individuals, is currently neutral or slightly re-
gressive (as in, pro-rich).
At the time of writing, there were few data on who was claiming the SEISS (but 
Blundell and Machin (2020) report on the extent to which self-employed workers’ busi-
nesses are affected by the pandemic and on what sort of self-employed workers said 
that they intended to claim it). Self-employment is most common at the very bottom 
and very top of the household income distribution, but the restrictions to SEISS access 
will be likely to affect both of these groups, with those on lower incomes less likely to 
have filed tax returns, and some of those on higher incomes missing out due to high 
profits or incorporation, so it is possible that the greatest impact of this scheme will be 
felt in the middle of the income distribution.
The increased generosity of means-tested benefits announced in response to COVID-
19 will help those who were receiving UC or tax credits before the crisis, as well as the 
newly unemployed or those whose earnings have fallen who go on to claim UC. Brewer 
and Handscomb (2020) shows the ‘overnight’ distributional impact of these changes. 
As would be expected from an increase in means-tested support, the majority of the 
beneficiaries are in the bottom half  of the income distribution and, on average, the 
changes provide a boost to family incomes of nearly 5 per cent in the bottom quartile 
(Brewer and Tasseva (2020, Figure 4) comes to a similar conclusion, although it ex-
presses gains as a fraction of before-housing-costs income, meaning that the gains are 
shown to be a smaller fraction of income).
(iii) The overall impact on the income distribution
At the time of writing, there were only three studies that suggested how the crisis might 
be affecting the distribution of income. Brewer and Gardiner (2020) report results from 
a survey that asked working-age adults about changes in household income between 
February and May 2020. They show that the experience of a fall in income is distrib-
uted surprisingly evenly across the (pre-coronavirus) income distribution: 37 per cent of 
adults in the bottom 40 per cent of working-age family-level incomes reported income 
falls, as did 35 per cent of adults in the top 40 per cent. Indeed, experience of increases 
in income was actually most common among adults at the bottom of the pre-coronavi-
rus income distribution; this could be due to the increases in benefit entitlement.
This study did not quantify the scale of the income changes. But two studies have 
used nowcasting techniques to simulate the distributional impact of the crisis by esti-
mating the distribution of household incomes and comparing that to a counterfactual 
world where the crisis did not happen. These are: Brewer and Tasseva (2020), who use 
the data on job loss and falls in earnings analysed in Benzeval et al. (2020) to estimate 
how the crisis has affected household incomes in April 2020, and Bronka et al. (2020), 
who use data collected from an expert survey of 2,644 economists to estimate how the 
crisis has affected incomes in the full financial year 2020/21.7
7 As the paper was being finalized, the government published its own analysis of how the crisis had af-
fected the distribution of incomes, coming to broadly the same conclusions as the studies discussed in the 
text: see HMT (2020).
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/oxrep/article/36/Supplem
ent_1/S187/5863392 by guest on 02 O
ctober 2020
Mike Brewer and Laura GardinerS196
Both studies estimate, on average, that the crisis reduces household incomes, and the 
falls in income are greater in proportional terms for households who would have been at 
the top of the income distribution. However, the estimated impacts vary markedly, with 
Brewer and Tasseva (2020) forecasting a 9 per cent fall, and Bronka et al. (2020) a 1 per 
cent fall. The most likely explanation is that the former paper is an assessment of how 
COVID-19 is affecting incomes in April 2020 only, and the latter is making an assessment 
over the 2020/21 financial year. Poverty rates against a fixed poverty line are simulated to 
rise in Brewer and Tasseva (2020)’s analysis (from 17.4 to 19.8 per cent; Table A.4).
(iv) The impact on wider measures of household living standards
To come to a full understanding of the impact of the current crisis on living standards 
across the distribution, and poverty, it is helpful also to go beyond measures of living 
standards other than income.
Figure 3, from Brewer and Gardiner (2020), shows how adults report both income 
and spending to have changed between February and May 2020, and find a strong distri-
butional gradient: 38 per cent of adults in the top (pre-coronavirus, working-age) income 
quintile have experienced no income falls but have had a reduction in spending com-
pared to just 12 per cent of those in the bottom quintile. Consumption is often viewed 
as an alternative and more detailed lens on living standards, compared to income and 
income-based poverty measures (see Brewer et al. (2017) and Gardiner et al. (2017), for 
example), and in normal times we would usually interpret falls in spending as indicative 
of a decline in household resources. Here, it seems likely that the fall in spending reflects 
more an inability to spend money, given that much of the hospitality, non-food retail, 
and leisure sectors had been shut down from late March to May 2020. If so, then, for 
many families, especially the better off, falls in spending probably reflect ‘enforced saving’ 
(Corry (2020) shows that better-off families devoted more of their spending to the sec-
tors that were shut down). This is matched by subjective data: Brewer and Gardiner 
(2020) report that adults in the (pre-coronavirus, working-age) top quintile were as likely 
to say that their personal financial situation has improved as worsened (23 per cent com-
pared to 22 per cent), whereas in the bottom quintile the figures are 10 per cent vs 36 
per cent. Adults in the (pre-coronavirus, working-age) bottom quintile were also more 
likely to say that they were now more concerned about finances than they were before the 
crisis than were adults in the top quintile. And these results are matched by analysis in 
Bangham and Leslie (2020), which show that low-income working-age families are more 
likely (than high-income families) to have reduced their saving rate, or increased their 
use of consumer debt, or borrowed from friends and family. Benzeval et al. (2020) also 
find the same patterns of mitigation behaviours among those whose earnings have fallen, 
with running down savings being most common in the bottom income quintile group, 
and borrowing more or receiving loans from family and friends being most common in 
the bottom two quintile groups. Overall, data so far strongly suggest that high-income 
families are more likely to have seen a strengthening of the household’s financial pos-
ition, and that the implications of this crisis are more serious for the living standards of 
lower-income (working-age) families than higher-income ones.
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IV. Summary and conclusions
This article has analysed the UK government’s three main policies to protect directly 
household incomes during the coronavirus crisis. We have also considered the emerging 
evidence on the overall impact of the pandemic on the living standards of low-income 
households, given what is known at the time of writing about the distributional pattern 
of the labour market shock and the major policy responses.
So far, it seems that a bottom-heavy labour market hit has not translated into as 
bottom-heavy a hit to family incomes, partly due to the success of  the (strength-
ened) social security safety net in cushioning the blow—at least to some extent, 
and for some—and partly because many at the bottom of  the income distribution 
are unaffected by job loss. On the other hand, looking at wider measures of  living 
standards reveals a more concerning picture, with those in (pre-crisis) lower-income 
families being far more likely to have taken on new debt, or borrowed from friends 
or family, or cut back on saving; this reflects not that the income falls have been 
greater than among higher-income households but that they have been less likely to 
have experienced a (probably enforced) reduction in spending. This, in addition to 
evidence on people’s assessments of  their own situation, suggests that the crisis is 
having more marked negative effects on the living standards—considered broadly—
of lower-income working-age families than of  higher-income families. Furthermore, 
this comes after several years where incomes have grown very slowly at the bottom 
of  the income distribution, particularly measuring incomes after housing costs have 
been deducted (Bourquin et al., 2020).
Most of the evidence to date comes from surveys of working-age adults. We surmise, 
though, that those above working age will be less affected, in financial terms, by the cor-
onavirus crisis than those of working age. Lower-income people over the pension age 
in UK get the majority of their income from the government in social security benefits, 
rather than the labour market. And although asset prices have fallen and interest rates 
are very low (both of which tend to reduce the income that people can get from their 
investments), this crisis is not rooted in the financial markets, as was the recession after 
the global financial crisis.
These findings offer important lessons for policy-makers. As the government con-
siders how policies should develop over the recovery phase of  this crisis—includ-
ing what (if  anything) should replace the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme after 
October 2020, the introduction of  support to help unemployed people return to work, 
and any extension of  the currently temporary £20 per week uplift to Universal Credit 
or other changes to welfare benefits—policy-makers should be particularly focused 
on providing support to those on lower incomes where the changes in overall finan-
cial circumstances have been the most concerning so far. Further down the track, any 
fiscal consolidation after this crisis that is needed to reduce the government’s deficit 
should be designed with an eye to those whose overall financial situation has been 
least affected by the crisis. Appreciating the differential impacts of  this crisis on dif-
ferent groups within society will allow policy-makers to support the recovery most 
effectively, and prevent the coronavirus crisis, as far as is possible, from becoming a 
long-term crisis in living standards.
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